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Foreword
As a rote, facts are more credihie than theories and that is why we 
prefer them. However, only such things can assume the nature of facts 
which are possihte to grasp, describe or formuiate. This, in turn, calls for 
notions and categories to he supplied by theory.
No one raises doubts as to the existence of private international law; 
optimists go as far as recognizing the existence of even international law. 
The problem arises when it comes to describing the relations between the 
two of' them. The attempt which follows is made along two paths. On the 
one hand, the extent to which international law as a whole and private 
international law as a whole are preconditions for one another or factors 
determining one another is considered in Part I while Part 11 of this study 
considers the actual norms and legal institutions from a close range in an 
effort to find out whether or not it can be proved that they have come to be 
included in international law or private international law from the other 
system of law or. if in a given case, they should he considered independent 
areas that cannot be classified into one or the other of the categories. In 
our case the latter possibility is essential. The objective is not to classify 
the disputed norms and institutions into the category of international 
law or private international law; quite the contrary, what is considered 
to he an achievement is the description of the yrey zone lying between the 
black and white zones. These phenomena which are of a double nature 
are far from being anomalies or distortions; in actual fact, they are norms 
on an equal footing with the provisions of international law or private 
international law the description of which (in a manner completely free 
from the biased approach only too characteristic of international lawyers 
and private international lawyers) may well result in the birth of cate­
gories that are useful even for practice.
1. The relations between international law and private 
international iaw (Ontology)
7. (b/c.s/i'oM.s om/ ;/Ay /Ae pricu/e /??/erMu//o)m/e /ow e^/e/f
When studying the relations between international law as a whole and 
private international law as a whole, the first question to be considered is 
this: why does a state permit that its organs applying the law can take 
decisions on the basis of provisions borrowed from foreign legislators and 
why does it make it possible to enforce decisions taken abroad.
The relations between the state and the natural and legal persons 
subordinated to its authority, the regulation of these relations and the 
connections between legal entities are of vital importance from the point 
view of the state and their survival and reproduction. If the state permits 
outside intervention, it must surely have good reason for doing so. The 
reasons for this sort of submissiveness as well as the limits to this sub­
missiveness have long been sought by scholars of private international 
law.
Way back in the 17th century Voet was of the opinion that respect 
and courtesy by one state for another make the states permit foreign law 
to be applied on territories belonging to their sovereignty. By saying so he 
formulated the essence of the doctrine of comity. In his "System des 
heutigen römisches Recht" Savigny deducted private international law 
from the international legal community thus creating a basis resting on 
natural law and international law for the existence of private international 
law.* (STEVENSON, p 565). This is sufficient to indicate the two possible 
directions of the explanation. 7'Ae /b.s/ one y/ree priority /o /Ae ¿7a/e maAiny 
/Ac appiica/ioM q^/orciya iaw a?a/ /Ae ea*/e?;/ q/* i/.s* yaiaiwy yrmoa/ depe^ dCM/ 
oa /Ae ?cii/ o/* /Ae .s/a/e wAiie /Ae .second one .s?/yye.s7.y /Aa/ /Aere i.s a eonnnand 
wAicA i.s Aa.sirai/y q/* /Ae na/nre q/ in/erna/io?nd /an; and wAicA /orre.s /Ac .s/a/e.s 
/root OM/.side and no .s/a/e can wi/Adraw i/.sc//'/ ro?n i/. Obviously, in both 
cases and, in particular, in the second one, the point at issue is the extent 
to which foreign law can penetrate, that is to say the depth to which it 
can penetrate into the law of a given state.
Those who choose the first path and are the advocates of the deter­
mining role of the state generally take advantage of the arsenal of notions 
used for proving and defending absolute sovereignty. According to the 
backbone of their arguments the state is competent to draw the lines within 
which its laws are valid. (SCHNI TZER, pp 22 and 25 and NIEDERER, p 
64, and, in particular, the Working Group: Völkerrecht p 74.) This was 
the predominant view when the Code of Hungarian Private international 
Law, (Decree with theForceofLaw No. 13, 1676) was formulated as reflected 
by the commentary given by the Ministry of Justice: "following the tradi­
tional principle of private international law the path is generally opened
* T o p ro m o te  leg ib ility  sim ple  foo tno tes like th is  a rc  g iven  in th e  te x t .  T he work 
q u o ted , for exam ple  STH V K N SO X 's is given in th e  R eferences.
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up for the application of foreign legal provisions referring to legal condi­
tions containing foreign elements and so it expresses in several respects 
/Ac <y 0/  AiMW (kir o/* ^, that is to say the principle
of modern comity which is something like a neo-comitv". (See MADL, 
On the first . . . p 258.)
According to the advocates of the second path the command of inter­
national law forces the states to apply the provisions of private internatio­
nal law. This is the position maintained, among others, by Ferenc Madl 
and Lajos Vckas: "According to the predominant concept of today the obliga­
tion of the states to mutually recognize each other's legal system stems from 
public international law; this is a willingness that within certain limits 
and provided certain preconditions exist foreign law is applied to the 
hearing of the case of the private international law. In this sense the exis­
tence of private international law is rooted in the public international law". 
(MADL —V^IiAS p 47.) It is interesting to note that the formulation 
given by Raapc and Sturm is almost identical. (RAAPE —STURM p 44.) 
However, a person educated in debates of orthodox international law will 
immediately recognize that what is lying behind these two types of app­
roaches is basically the traditional debate in international law described 
as "dualism or monoism, and if the latter is the case, which is the primary 
one?". The limitation involved in the word "basically" is necessaiy be­
cause those who recognize the determining role of international law or at 
least its nature of setting limits do not necessarily maintain that internatio­
nal law and domestic law belong to the same system. (I shall come back to 
the question of whether or not private international law is purely internal 
law at a later stage.) For it is possible that on the basis of a modest dualist 
position which recognizes that there is a sort of communication between 
the two legal systems or branches the idea of international law being the 
primary factor can also arise. The essence of this view is that although 
international law does not belong to the same system as private inter­
national law, but it does contain provisions which involve obligations for 
the states at least inasmuch as specifying their range of authority. In 
other words, it is the task of international law to define state competence 
and to "divide up competences". (NIEDERER, 74.) Naturally, the ad­
vocates of these views are quite modest. Ferid (FERID p 32.) maintains 
that the states are bound by international customary law not to refrain com­
pletely from applying foreign law, not to deviate arbitrarily from their 
own law of conflict of laws or respect the acquired rights but he adds 
that these norms cannot be regarded as provisions applied in the Federal 
Republic of Germany either. Raape and Sturm do not go any further than 
stating (RAAPE —STURM p 44.) that it would run counter to internatio­
nal law ii the private international law of a country were composed of one 
provision only stating that domestic law must be applied in every case 
that has international implications. It would also be considered as a viola­
tion of international law if a state took the liberty of excluding the law as 
a whole of another state belonging to the community of states from the 
laws applicable on the basis of collision norms. I am of the opinion that
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the two authors are right thus choosing the easy method of cutting short 
the histórica) etahoration of the debate on duahsni and monoism and 
pointing out that a good rewiew taking a monistic view with the primacy 
of internationa) !aw is given in a studv written bv Lásztó Bodnar (See 
BODNAR).
2. P rodae/ioa/oree.s, prodwed'oa eoaddioa.s a ad  socereá/a/y
Instead of entering into further detaüs of the history of schoiarship tet 
us examine the ideas of sovereignty associated with the theory of duaiism 
and monoism: in other words let us study the basis on which the existence 
of the states and their acceptance in the internationa) )ega) community 
is realised. In case it is sufficient for the estabhshment and surviva) ol a 
state to organize its own society and ensure its reproduction a)ong with its 
own reproduction, we can say that state sovereignty is intact and this fol- 
)ows from the state itself. According to this concept international law does 
not mean more than the occ-asiona) and incidenta) encounter of the wi))s 
of the state which can either be of a duahst nature or it can tie embodied 
in a monoistic concept dec)aring the priority of domestic )aw. However, if 
we set out from the idea that every state exists in an environment made up 
of the other states ant) this externa) work) means, at the same time, the 
condition for its surviva). it is easy to arrive at the conc)usion that inter­
nationa) )aw can contribute to creating sovereignty ant) to keeping it alive, 
that is, it is an essentia) condition for the existence of the states and one of 
its guarantees for their surviva). )n this case sovereignty must be regarded 
as ''limited" and embedded in the correction system made up by the other 
states and. to a certain extent, it must a)so be considered as a phenomenon 
ensured by international law. This is the manner in which we can arrive at 
a relativetv dualistic or at a monoistic idea recognizing the primacy of 
international )aw. According to this system of thoughts international 
law is of a greater significance, it is of a "higher order" than internal law 
because in the form of agreements between states it creates a guarantee of 
such quality for the survival of a party to this agreement for which a state 
would not be capable of on its own. This hierarchic advantage, however, 
does not mean supranationality since not the decision-maker )mt the de­
cision taken is over the individual states.
The question arises: why is this so important? Because with an inter 
pretation of the category of sovereignty taking into account even its poli- 
to)ogical implications we can arrive at the most acceptable explanation of 
the existence of private international law.
The process invotved is a simple one. Namely it is a process which is 
quite well-known but in )ega) thinking littie if any thought has been given 
to it except for some phrases. It can be described as the broadening of the 
range of production relations and their rearrangement. 77; e -s/oVe.s /aae 
Aeceuae depeadea/ oa o?;e /o .sac/; aa e.r/ea/ /An/ /Acre :.s prac/icfd/y an
xea.se ;a upp/yray /7;e /erwt "soca;/ eoad;7;oa.s" /o era ;ad::;d;ad .sdde. The 
dimensions in which the markets exist, the capital and goods move or
194 BOLMZSARKAGY
manpower migrates are broader than a state, sometimes as great as those 
of a region or the whoie world. And this point must be given due conside­
ration when it comes to analysing law as a 'category of the superstructure". 
In the first stage this means a more realistic approach to sovereignty 
which, as you will sec later, is also embodied in the recognition of relative 
immunity that replaces absolute immunity. In this connection it can be 
stated that of the states that are formally independent from a legal aspect 
and constitute part and parcel of a system of mutual, economic and politi­
cal interdependence "only that state is a -sotereiyn one which can have as 
much influence or even more impact on the decisions taken by the states 
with which it is in contact than they have on its own decisions." (VALKI, 
L .: Organizational . . .  p 426.) Thus in a politological sense we mean 
a balanced system of dependence and not an absolute freedom of action 
when we are seeking the content of sovereignty.
The reply to be given to the basic question can be reached in the se­
cond stage, that is, why does a state permit that the law of another state 
is applied on its own territory? The answer is that this is required bv the 
state of affairs since the fact that social and production conditions go bev­
ond the national limits has become an indispensable condition for the 
survival and reproduction of the societies.
The production conditions do not need a passport to cross the bound­
aries. However, the persons and things in which these conditions are 
embodied need one. To speak in simpler terms, it follows from its ontologi­
cal nature that the law must reflect the expansion and rearrangement of 
the economic conditions that constitute its basis. Thus the states that make 
the collision norms and the unified law regulating, "enabling" the above 
process do no more than take notice of the command of facts and in this 
manner" so much the better for them." Therefore, /Ae e.n'.s/ewc o/* prba/c 
¿я/егнй/тмл? Aw :.s /Ac coa.scqaencc о/' есономас accc.s'.s;/?/ ewAorZied in /Ac 
-S'<y.s7e?M q/' мм/мм? depeMf/cnce. International law is a secondary factor, a 
deducted reason, but it is necessary to make references to it inasmuch as 
it supplies the formal means of the linkage between states. (The internatio­
nal agreements describing the provisions of a content of private internatio­
nal law will be further discussed in Chapter 11.) It goes without saying 
that international law could not remain unaffected while changes of such 
dimensions took place in world economy. A basic principle stating the 
obligation of the states for cooperation was established the essence of 
which is not composed of the less concrete norms formulated by it but 
rather of the fact that by making a general call it points out a manner in 
which the states should behave and the way in which their international 
law which reflects their behaviour should be moulded. (NAGY, B.: pp 
275 — 280.) The formulations of this principle which are not legally binding 
such as the Declaration of the UN General Assembly. No. 2625 of 1970 on the 
principles of international law regulating friendly relations between states 
or the Declaration of Principles in the Helsinki Final Act about the prin­
ciples valid for the 35 countries parties to the Document make it clear 
that cooperation should be affected in general fields including economic
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cooperation irrespective of the economic, social and political system of the 
cooperating states. This fundamental principle of international law makes 
cooperation between states obligatory, even if only in general terms, and 
reflects the recognition brought about by economic changes that the states 
cannot pull out of the joint regulation of the reproduction of the world, 
f t follows then that to this end they must make provisions of private inter­
national law promoting economic cooperation providing foresight and 
calculability. To this extent international law also acts as a reason for 
the existence and expansion of private international law, but I have to 
emphasize that the final, ontological explanation to the problem lies in 
the production conditions and not in international law.
3. /1 A;/po/Ae.s<'.s %&o?;/ /Ac po.s.s;77e rc;;/;v;/ poiw/s q/ ?'eA?/;o?;.s- Ac/acca ¿a/craa- 
/;o?;aZ u ad  pr;';-u/e bderaedioau/ doc
A more thorough examination of the production conditions, that is, 
economic conditions and relations between persons and objects associated 
with them gives rise to further ideas. I think if we consider the point seri­
ously that law is of reflective character what is suggested, among others, 
by Vilmos Peschka (PESCHKA, V.: pp 37 — 4!).), it is well worth looking 
behind the screen of the law to find out more about the interpretation of 
the changes of the law. The forms of reality are like by a membrane or 
film held together by the threads of the law while its creases are determi­
ned by the forms themselves. This can serve as a basis for the following 
hypothesis which is still to be proved.
77; c rcd;/;o?;.S' Ac/icee?; ;;;/c;;;r;/;'o;;u/ d;;r a;;<7 p; ; ' tY d c  ia/eraa/duad /a;c or 
/Ac foa/ca/ q/ /Ac y/cy zone /A<*d /;;.s'C.s /Ac cAarac/eri.dics q/ /Ac /;co o/ /Aca; are 
depeadea/ oa /Ac .wrdd aad ccoaoa; ;'c .s;/.s7e;a o/ /Ae coaa/r;'c.s' a Ao.se red;/;oa.s 
are ia/eaded /o Ae a/adied. The expansion of the production conditions is 
not of the same intensity in each direction. It is quite obvious that their fre­
quency and depth are dependent on whether these conditions are created 
between countries with the same or different social systems. The extent of 
mutual dependence is different within socialist and capitalist countries or 
between the two groups. Moreover, even the developing nations have their 
own specific interests that are manifested in private international law or 
international law the form which it assumes.
As a first step let us examine the relations between the members of 
the two opposing world systems. Their political foundation is peaceful 
coexistence and their practical guideline is cooperation providing for 
mutual and balanced benefits and advantages. This is the field in which 
the socialist countries are only too keen to guard sovereignty which means 
the defence of the institutions constituting the foundations of their social 
system. It is the consequence of this state of affairs that rules of conflicts 
of law or uniform law included in international legal agreements are most 
likely to be established in the traditional areas of private international 
law such as the civil law relations of the individuals, in the field of family 
law or in the area of commercial law which corresponds to the extent to
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which the given socialist country has made the worid market into an ele­
ment of its own economic system. There are very few norms, however, 
promoting the movement of capital or manpower or those providing for 
the state to figure as a civil law entity.
If a comparison of the system of legal provisions is made for the coun­
tries belonging to the same bloc or group specific central points can be identi­
fied.
Concerning the relations between the socialist countries the objective 
is to translate the principle of socialist internationalism into practice in 
respect of the political plane and international law. This means in practice 
that within this group of nations there are several agreements of private 
international law nature, concerning citizenship, legal assistance, and so 
on, and, on the other hand, they are not so much anxious about sovereignty 
being violated, a fact reflected in the intensity of interstate relations. If 
the social foundations are identical, it is not difficult to formulate provisi­
ons involving the fundamental production conditions. It follows from the 
special economic role of the socialist state that it can produce phenomena 
in fairly large numbers belonging to the grey zone in which zone the major 
characteristic of the state is not that it is the bearer of the sovereignity but 
that it is the most important and actual economic factor. In such a posi­
tion it has the power to coordinate the plans and production or divide up 
the related tasks and to establish contacts not only on the market. W ith 
this it makes communication on ministry and trust level more frequent 
which brings about specific legal formulas. This finds expression in the 
Comecon's technique of regulation as well as in the management of the 
foreign trade of the individual countries.
Concerning the relations between the capitalist countries, in addition 
to the quite elaborate traditional provisions of the private international 
law, provisions making the free flow and migration of capital, manpower 
and services possible are made at an ever increasing pace along with pro­
visions eliminating the trade barriers. It is not the common economic po­
sition taken by the states that is characteristic, but rather their uniform 
endeavour for creating indentical conditions for the factors of the eco­
nomy inclusive of the natural and legal persons.
Law-making which is of an integrational character and is carried on 
within the Common Market is of particular importance constituting a 
challenge for international lawyers and private international lawyers to 
revise their theories.
In the absence of sufficient information I am not in a position to 
make a statement about the developing countries. However, it is beyond 
any doubt that their economic and trade ties with the highly industrialized 
states are more important from their point of view. Concerning the legal 
implications guiding these ties my hypothesis is the following: in the rela­
tions between the developing nations and the socialist countries agree­
ments translating the political principle of international solidarity into 
practice are of decisive importance. It is characteristic of these agreements 
that the socialist countries offer complex services that follow from the
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leading economic rote they are [¡laying. In other words, the agreements 
they eoneiude are not of a genera! normative nature, for example, one 
that regutates the investment of capita), but very frequency they agree 
on the buiiding of a complete project. It is done in two stages as a ru!e. 
that is to say on the ptane of international law and private international 
law that breaks the former down.
The relations between the capitalist countries and developing nations 
are characterized by the fact that the latter group is all out to eliminate 
even the traces of colonization, that they wage a struggle against neo­
colonialism and. at the same time they are very largely dependent on 
foreign capital and technology. This applies, in particular to those devel­
oping countries that have chosen the path of capitalist development. Thus 
in their relations detailed regulations are established for investment, the 
movement of currency and for the flow of technological information. Agree­
ments clarifying the possibilities of expropriation and nationalization are 
also important, or the relevant customary law which, according to western 
international lawyers does exist (SORENSEN. editor. Manual pp 626 — 
-626.).
In connection with the developing countries the role of those inter­
national organizations which are subjects of international law is well 
worth mentioning. The status of the provisions regulating the financial, 
economic or technological assistance given by these organizations is bv 
no means easy to describe from a theoretical point of view.
To summarize what has been discussed above the relations between 
international law and private international law as well as the volume of 
the grey zone between them is presumably dependent on the social svstem 
adopted by the two countries under examination. The objective of this 
chapter, however, is merely to describe the most general correlations for 
which an additional thing is necessary, namely the content of the value of 
the two legal systems.
). IT;/?«? .sc/c?/;'???? '??- ?';;/?«? ;?;;/?//<??'<??;??('
It is a commonplace in Marxist literature on law that internal law 
possesses a value content and that social conditions are arranged bv inter­
nal law in the interest of some social force and. accordingly, in compliance 
with the order of values [¡referred by that force. The fact that this problem 
must not be interpreted in a simplified manner is indicated by the meticulo­
usly accurate formulation made by Vilmos Peschka: "Tracing the value 
content of legal norms back to class interests, in [¡articular, to the specific 
interests of the ruling class, in other words, to define the value content of 
legal norms as though it was class content is far from being sufficient to 
end the pluralistic, relativist and contradictory nature which is charac­
teristic of the value content of legal norms. The relationships between 
the contradictory interests of heterogeneous classes, between the actual, 
daily and historical interests of the ruling class and the interests of the 
state organ expressing them make it absolutely clear that the value con-
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tent of the legal norms that develop on this level and in this kind of synthe­
sis is verv far from being homogeneous. Therefore, icgai nortns revea! a 
])!uraiistic and retative eharaeter even in case it ean be stated as a tendency 
that ///e in/ae coa/eu/ o/ /Ac /cy?/ avaia.s uredc/er^n'aed/aar/roaeM/u7(j'/ uw/ ;'a u 
Ais/oricu/ perspcc/ire A;/ /Ac iw/erc.s/.s o//Ac r/di/iy cA/s.s". (FESCHKA, V., pp 
166 — 167. A quote 1 picked.)
A venture designed to seek the value content of international law- 
leads to a diametrically opposed result. It is the fundamental characteristic 
of agreements between the tw o world systems, or speaking in more general 
terms, of agreements aiming at universality that the force determining 
the internal law of one of the social systems cannot become predominant 
for the other. None of those making international law can gain the upper 
hand because the essence of the related provisions is mutual agrement 
based upon compromises and coordination of the w ill of sovereign and 
legally independent states. That is why the opposition between the two 
world systems cannot be resolved or eliminated by international law in a 
positive fashion: its potentials are limited to saving the separated status 
of the states and to defending the prevailing order of the community of 
states. A logical conclusion was drawn fiom this train of thoughts for the 
first time in Hungarian literature on the subject by László Valki who said. 
"The norms that constitute the backbone of the present system of inter­
national norms are indifferent, neutral and irrelevant from the point of 
view of the final value". (VALKI. L .: On the Value Content of internatio­
nal Law . . .  p. 9.) It is not an integral part of the subject being considered 
right now though it is part and parcel of the truth that putt ing aside neutra­
lity international law* has opened up a path for changing the status quo 
when it recognizes the people's right of self-determination. And limitation 
of the means that can be resorted to in the case of a conflict betw een states 
such as the prohibition of the use of force, and so on is, in effect, a value by 
itself, as is pointed out by the author quoted above.
From our point of view supplying an answer to the following question 
can be a step forward. If domestic law is basically of a value content and 
if at the same time the universal rules of international law that is to say 
the rules applicable between the two work! systems are above all neutral 
meaning that they cannot be associated with the interests or with the 
value system of any class or social force the question arises: what can be 
said about the rules of private international law and the grey zone?
Basically, private international law is also neutral meaning that its 
stock of provisions is not subordinated to the value system of any of the 
societies. This aspect is underlined, among others, by Ferenc Hadi when he 
concludes that "in addition to the relatively smaller role played by the 
relations of production the decisive factor is the practically direct force of 
the means of production, the influence exerted by mutual interests associat­
ed w ith the uniform stability of international exchange conditions, and 
so on. In these relations and in legal institutions regulating modern ex­
change and technological conditions the decisive role played by the forces 
of production and the standards of their development which are approxi-
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mutely identical is of primary importance apart from the genera) role 
played by production re)ations with which the commands received from 
the forces of production are transferred in different, for example, in social ist 
or non-socialist directions. As a consequence the legal form adopted (al- 
hough it is designed to serve different objectives depending on the social- 
system). is, in the function of wi ye?:<?rt,s )ega) regulation, after all identical 
or similar." (MADL, F .: Comparative . . . p 203.) The economic conditions 
bringing about private international law, the association between states 
that follows from the condition of the forces of production can boil down to 
the same point as in the case of international law, that is, the conflict and 
substantial rules of private international law are ?to/ value selecting.
It is not permissible to render this neutrality to be too absolute. If 
the conflict rules of a given country lead to the application of the law of 
another state and this foreign law is basically conflicting with the domestic 
legal system of the state concerned and with the value system it expresses, 
then the general "defensive" institution of private international law will 
come into play: this is the clause of "ordre public". Hv referring to this the 
forum concerned can refuse to apply the law of another country. Article 
7 of the Code of Hungarian private international law states the following: 
"The application of foreign law should be discarded in case it runs counter 
to Hungarian public policy." Public policy means the fundamental legal 
institutions which are defined by imperative rules. In actual fact this 
coincides with the internal cornerstones of sovereignty, the political sys­
tem, the principal rules governing property relations and the pillars of 
citizenship law. Thus the norms of private international are not completely 
insensitive to values. Even if they would incidentally lead to a settlement 
denying the values of the domestic legal system, they might as well be 
treated parenthetically with the aid of the clause of public order. This 
method, however, is merely an "exceptional one and is of a defensive 
character; it is designed to protect the prevailing legal order and cannot 
lead to discriminatory objectives" — this is stated by the commentary 
given by the Minister of Justice and is attached to the Code and it is also 
supported by para 2 Article 7: "2. The application of foreign law cannot be 
discarded merely because the social and economic system of the country 
concerned is different from that of Hungary." In other words, private 
international law does not adopt any discrimination and as such it makes 
it possible to adopt the provisions of any foreign legal systems because 
their overwhelming majority belong to the value indifferent zone. 
A distinction is only made in connection with the possible penetra­
tion of a value system which is extremely conflicting by adopting the 
clause of public order.*
* '[ 'h r excep tiona] c h a ra c te r  o f  th e  a p p lic a tio n  o f  public  o rd e r is gen era lly  recognized; 
e. g . F E l t lD  p p  60 — ('<). T h e  a u th o r  em b ark s on  th e  jo b  o f  lis tin g  item  by  item  th e  in s ti­
tu tio n s  to  be  p ro tec te d  b y  p ub lic  o rd e r in th e  law  o f  W est G e rm an y  (pp 63 — 64.).
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II. Internationa! !aw, private international !aw and the related border 
areas — from a iega! dogmatic approach
1. TAc
The term "legal dogmatic" figuring in the tit!e of Part II should be 
treated asone without any negative or pejorative implications. In the follow­
ing the assembly of phenomena composed of these two or three elements 
and which are difficult to describe will be approached in the conventional 
manner. What concerns the differences they lie, compared to what can be 
read in literature about this subject, in the fact that the objective is not 
necessarily to give a traditional answer to the highly traditional questions 
(definition, subject, legal sources, object, application) or point out one bv 
saying that "this is the only correct answer"; it is much rather the objective 
to prove that the questions put in the well-tested categories cannot be 
answered by replies of the same category. In a number of cases the prob­
lem cannot be solved by classfying the items into the two categories of 
international law and private international law as distinct from one another 
for there will be grey elements left over and to be disposed of. And they 
need to be placed) into the limelight rather than to be put aside as incon­
venient because what they reveal is not the shortcoming of the skills of the 
researcher but the recognition that a highly contradictory system with 
plenty of overlapping is being examined and the real result in this case 
can be its true reproduction. And in case the researcher can classify each 
phenomenon into the category of international law or private international 
law he has most certainly used force when treating facts.
2. ?V;e Яоме
It is characteristic of the phenomena belonging to the grey zone, that 
is to say, of the objects of subsequent analysis that one of their composite 
elements does not come from the same legal system as the rest. The factors 
of international law, private international law or other branches of law 
come to he mixed. The reason for this may be the fact that one of the sub­
jects of the legal relations of a nature of international law is not an inter­
national legal subject or that the object of legal relations between two inter­
national legal subjects are of the nature of private law, or that the legal 
relations of private international law nature are settled by international 
legal provisions and at last that relations belonging to one sphere are rea­
lized by the mechanism of enforcement of law of another sphere.
A) Acyu/ Л'мбуес/
In the field of legal subjects the greatest difficulty is posed by the 
diversity of the state. It has been of common knowledge for long that the 
status taken by a state can be one of iure imperii, that is, by wearing all 
the armours of their sovereignty when they enjoy full immunity or one of
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iure gestionis, that is. in the capacity of private iaw which is. in fact, the 
status of a 'm erchant" when the state is just one of t tie many private entities. 
However, the custom of enjoying the advantages associated with sovereignty 
in these retations is stit) going strong in rotations between states, that is, 
the attitude not to subject themsetves either to foreign taw or a foreign 
court. A ctassic exampte to this effect is supplied by the foreign trade 
missions of the Soviet Union which enjoy immunity tinked with sovereignty 
even in simpte business deats except when they retinpuish this right in a 
bitatera! agreement or in a contract (BUCOSLAYSKY p 118.). th e  du 
atism of iure imperii and iure guestionis rotes is atready reflected from 
a tegal aspect in the western countries, in 1972, the European Convention 
on State Immunity was signed the essence of which is that att the states 
are entitted to functional immunity meaning that in purety iure gestionis 
cases they are not exempt either from the force of foreign taw or fro in the 
competence of a foreign court. In the tegistature and judicial science of 
the sociatist countries the idea has atso arisen that with functional immu­
nity direct retations between states could be made more batanced and 
more effective. Funcionat immunity is recognized by the Hungarian pri 
vate international taw code on the basis of reciprocity. (HADL: On the 
first . . . p. 278.. and concerning the theoretica) debate on the probtem see 
llADL-SÚLYOl! . . .  pp 2)7-288.)
It is no easy matter to find out the capacity in which the state is in 
votved in given retations. Fortunatety there are three approaches that can 
offer assistance to decide the probtem. Firstty. the retations cannot be 
purety of an international law character in case there is a tegatty incapabtc 
subject at the other end from the viewpoint of internationa) taw. Secondly, 
in case the parties at the oppsing ends are possible subjects of internationa) 
law, but the content of tegal retations is not related to sovereignty and 
the probtem is fundamentatty of the character of private taw. 1 hirdty. 
the question may be if a given organ or organization acts as the organ of 
the state or in the capacity of an independent tegat subject of the civil 
taw.
The examples for the first case are supplied by agreements con- 
ctuded by the states with tegat persons in the majority of cases with mutti- 
nationat companies. In such cases neither of the parties invoiced can 
impose its wit) on the other. The state wilt not become a simpte subject of 
civil taw, the tegat subject wit] not become sovereign. This is the case, for 
exampte. when the state obtains a toan on the international money market, 
a move of which the Internationa) Court stated that it is not an interna­
tional tegat affair (HAAt BUG p 25.), or in case a concession agrement is 
concluded. The fact that the latter betongs to the grey zone is indicated by 
Articte 2) of the agreement signed by the Persian Government and the 
Anglo —Iranian Git Company in 1988: "The contract ing parties dectarc 
that they base the performance of the present Agreement on principtes of 
mutuat goodwitt and good faith as wetl as on reasonabte interpretation of 
this Agreement.
The Company formatty undertakes to have regard at alt times amt in
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all place to the rights, priviieges and interests of the Government and shad 
abstain from anv action or omission which might be prejudica! to them.
This Concession shad not be annulled by the Government and the 
terms therein contained shad not be aitered either by general or special 
legislation in the future, or by administrative measures or any other acts 
whatever of the executive authorities. (The Article is quoted after McNair- 
McNAlH pp 6 -7 .)
ft is obvious from the passage quoted that the parties involved are in 
a "special" situation. The state represented by the Persian Government 
will remain to be sovereign but it cannot perform either legislative or 
executive functions in the given case. It is true that the Anglo —Iranian 
Oil Company does not become sovereign, but it is capable of limiting the 
area of activity of the sovereign to the extent similar to an agreement 
concluded with a subject of international law. The extent to which this 
case belongs to the grey zone is confirmed by the fact that the contracting 
parties specified an arbitral tribunal to act in case a dispute arises, that is 
to sav the Anglo —Iranian Oil Company did not subject itself to the legal 
authorities of the Persian state either and this tribunal had to take a deci­
sion on the basis of the rules specified in the Article quoted and not on 
the basis of a national law. It can therefore be stated that in the high 
number of agreements modelled along the lines of the one signed by the 
Persian Government and the Anglo —Iranian Oil Company both the state 
and the legal person are in a non-typical situation from the point of view 
of both international law and private international law. This fact dele­
gates the whole deal to the grey zone lying between the two of them.
The situation where the status of the state is determined by the special 
characteristics of the legal relation in which it is a party will be examined 
in the course of reviewing the theory and praxis of economic law.
In the third group of cases in which the iure imperii nature of the 
position taken by the state is questionable is when it cannot be identified 
quite clearly who is authorized or bound by a statement made by a given 
organ. An analyst finds himself in a situation only to easy to cope with 
when the document (agreement) in question has been signed on behalf of 
a certain state or its government and possibly it has also been approved 
or ratified following a complicated or simple procedure which is designed 
to be proof of its status in international law. Hut what happens if, for 
example, the leaders of the Board of Planning of two socialist countries 
conclude an agreement on the coordination of their plans or on exchanging 
statistical data, or when the leading officials of patent offices agree on 
going together to a third market (country), let alone, for instance, the 
cooperation protocols signed, say, by Academies of Sciences, a document 
which involves, among other things, the movement of persons and money. 
Socialist legal science is still seeking the answers to the problem (MÁDL — 
— SÓLYOM pp 225 — 227.), and it is very unlikely that the position out­
lined by Jenő Bobrovszky in connection with the patent offices can be 
transferred to another area on the basis of analogy. (I challenge it even in 
its own implications.) He writes that within the Council for Mutual Econo-
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mic Assistance, besides the agreements coneinded by the member states 
"a number of bilateral agreements have been signed by offices which, in 
essence, are also regarded as internationa) tega! agreements between states 
which are subjects of international law on behalf of which the offices have 
reached agreement on a given question" (HOHROVSZKY p 121). It 
remains to be questionable, however, whether or not a document signed 
by a patent office acting on its own behalf is directly binding for the state 
it belongs to. It must be stated that it is by no means an easy job to decide 
which state organ's action can be regarded as one directly linked with the 
state. The answer given by Ferenc Mádl and Lajos Vékás is that "actions 
taken by the legislative or administrative power of the state, in general 
the actions of the central administration entrusted with sui generis public 
law functions are regarded as actions by the state itself." (M ADL — VÉKÁS 
p 215.) The problem is, however, that the term sui generis public law 
function is still to be clarified all the more so because within the premises 
of Hungarian law judicial science refuses to accept the division into public 
law and private law, a classification broadly adopted in western legal 
science, and even if this would be forgotten by us as good-willed readers bv 
saying that we quite understand what the authors have in mind it is still 
to be tackled what the phrase "in general the actions of the central admi­
nistration" implies. For it is the cloak of ambiguity of the expression "in 
general" in which the core of the problem lies. It is ambiguous because 
the phrase might as well be completed saying: "but sometimes even the 
actions of non-central state administration" or saying: "but sometimes 
even not the actions of the central administration". A solution to the 
problem is offeree! if we accept that on the levels of both centra! and non­
central administration such agreements are conclueled which cannot be 
regarded as belonging either to the sphere of international law or private 
international law, because they belong to the grey zone lying between 
the two of them. This assumption is confirmed by the lines written by 
Ivan Szász in his article on the legal mechanism of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance: "The development of currency and monetary rela­
tions can have a significant impact on the development of the system of 
institutions regulating the relations of contract-law or .soMie/AiMy abai'/or 
between the enterprises of the member-states and also between their 
-skde oryuM.s". (SZÁSZ, p 216. Passage picked by the author.) In the rela­
tions between state organs which are similar to contract-law relations 
the state acts neither iure imperii nor iure gestionis but in the capacity of 
a legal entity belonging to the grey zone.
There are few problematic phenomena to be encountered if we take 
into account the situation of individuals and legal persons and temporarily 
put aside the conclusions stemming from the norms of internationa! custo­
mary law and international legal agreements including rules of the nature 
of private international law. The science of international law has assumed a 
uniform position on the question that apart from this neither the individual 
nor the legal person is the subject of international law, although there are 
certain agreements which make it possible for them to enter and emerge
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in the international arena. To this category beiong the provisions making it 
possibie for individuals to be compensated for directly under the peace 
treaties that followed the First World War and the provisions involving 
the western powers and the Federal Republic of Germany after the Second 
Wortd War which made it possibie to directly statisfy material demands 
arising in the wake of the occupation of Germany by the Allies through a 
court of arbitration. (DAHM, p 415.) The reason for mentioning them here 
in connection with the grey zone lies in the fact that they are of property 
law nature. Documents relating to human rights enabling individuals to 
be involved directly in international law such as the European Convention 
on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the petition right known in connection with the trusteeship 
system of the United Nations are not associated with the subject of this 
study.
H) 77;e (Myer/.s
We find ourselves faced with almost unsurmountable difficulties in 
respect of the jungle between pure international law and private interna­
tional law if we embark on examining the objects of regulation. The 20th 
century has given birth to such a complicated and articulated system of 
economic relations which proves practically impossible to be incorporated 
by any of the legal systems or legal branches. Hambro had good reason 
to write way back in 1962 "It would seem perfectly possible that interna­
tional financial and economic law is in the making and that such law would 
be eminently well fitted to govern relations between governments and 
such private companies. It would indeed be a natural and perhaps even 
necessary development of international law which would thus add a pro­
vince to its domain." (HAMHRO, pp 39 — 40.) Following a very witty and 
concise description of the "revolt of facts" Ferenc Madl said in 1978 that not 
only conventional private international law failed to cope with this revolu­
tion, but "the conventionallong standing branches of law such as civil law, 
trade law, international law, and administrative law have also been made 
to assume a similar inertia type of role at several places when an approach 
to the new phenomena was attempted to be made by them only from the 
direction of the old categories . . . The second stage of the revolt (while 
bearing it in mind that the stages are important primarily not from the 
aspect of sequence but much rather because of their content) is made up of 
those endeavours that seek a new order to replace anarchy: new theories 
are elaborated, new concepts and new disciplines are outlined in an effort 
to achieve a scientific interpretation and systematization of new facts 
and phenomena." (AlADL: Comparative . . . p 176.)
You may well ask: what is the point at issue? Briefly speaking, we 
can say that the task of international law has been to the present day to 
regulate relations between states which are directly associated with their 
sovereignty. The duty of private international law has been lying a level 
lower since it has been designed to regulate the relations between citizens
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and legal persons, through national and international conflict rules and at a 
later stage through uniform law. Intervention on the part of the state in 
the internal economy, or the foreign trade monopoly practised in the 
socialist countries and the formation of economic integrations have led 
to the multiplication of 'diagonal" type of relations connecting the planes 
of international law and private international law. To settle the problem 
with these relations both planes as well as administrative law. financial 
law and constitutional law have produced their own provisions. The reac­
tion on the part of legal science is nothing but a start made out of the actual 
content of regulated relations and the forms of reality instead of setting 
out from the law-making subject and the legal sources when determining 
the areas of law (the systems and branches of law). Of course the conclusion 
drawn from this starting basis is not of one type. As stated by Mád!, in the 
work by Loussouarn and Bredin entitled 'The Law of International 
Trade" "constitutional law, the administrative law, trade law, civil law. 
public international law, procedure) law (and as a reverse of the old state 
of affairs) private international law in the case of the individual institu 
tions are all in one bunch." (\lAl)L: Comparative . . .  p 195.) In his 
"European Community Law" Ipsén discusses the "norms of a nature of 
constitutional law, administrative law, tax law, commercial law, labour 
law, public international law private international law, procedural law. 
penal law* together with one another and makes the assumption that 
/oye/Acr a.s /Ary arc /Acy coM-sVi/M/e an inr/epenr/cn/ area a/' /a?c- a-A:rA és* r/a.scd 
in i/.sc(/. or a/ Zea.s/ c?*en i/ //icy arc cance/Zcd /Aey con/rnae /a re/arn /Aés or /Aa/ 
q/ /Aeir c/;arar/er but even if they are lifted out of this 'conglomerate sys­
tem' they cannot be forced back into their old category", (op. cit. p 199.)
Following no little struggle international economic law came to be 
declared as existing by a couple of people engaged in socialist judicial 
science. While Blagoievich spoke only of the need lor "a struggle to be 
waged with an outlook of comprehensive international economic law aga­
inst retrograde and reactionary forces hiding themselves behind the barri 
cades of classic public international law and other traditional branches of 
law" (op. cit. p 213). Boguslawski identifies a AraarA a/ /a?r /Aa/ és /a /Ac 
aiaAbry. At the same time Seiffcrt maintains that this process has already 
coaie /o aw end. Boguslawski and Seiffert force international economic law 
into the framework of the socialist economic integration. In Seiffcrt's view 
"Subjects of this branch of law are the states, other subjects of public in 
ternationa! law*, before all Comecon, international organizations for an 
economic branch, state organs and international and national economic 
enterprises" while the objects are "1. prognostics of economic policy, pro­
duction plans, coordination of technological development: 2. specializa­
tion, cooperation and standardization; 3. coordination of foreign trade 
plans; 4. coordination of investments and the foundation of joint com­
panies; 5. terms and conditions of trade and the exchange of goods and 
the related svstem of conditions including pricing and the relations between 
companies assuming the form of goods and money; <i. payment system: 
7. deliveries: 8. interstate directing bodies and their activities: 9. the sta-
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tutes of different international organs; 10. trade and shipping agreements 
(MADE: Comparative . . . 217.).
There is no need for iengthy comments on the prohicm. It is quite 
ciear that what we find here is the combination of the areas and norms of 
civii taw. administrative an, financial iaw, private international law and 
international law. It is not the duty of this study to draw the conclusions 
since its objective is confined merely to de.scnVjóu/ the grey zone and it does 
not want to adopt the method of rigid classification into categories. That 
is why it wishes to mention that the new university textbook for private 
international law will bear the title "Hungarian private international law- 
supplemented with the principal elements of the law governing interna­
tional economic relations". And what is covered by the term: law governing 
international economic relations, and why, can be read in a studv written 
bv Ferenc Mád! under a similar title (MÁDL: Comparative . . . pp 248 — 
-281).
The next in line in the points at which international law and private 
international law rub shoulders, or more exactly, where they overlap each 
other is the position of foreign citizens and legal persons. This obviouslv 
follows (rom the fact that the natural and legal persons are under the 
control of international law in connection with the norms concerning juris­
diction and of private international law, as the foreign element in the legal 
relation. Thus either one or the other of the disciplines would claim these 
areas for itseli. In France, Spain and in the other romanist countries as 
well as in the Soviet Union the law of aliens and citizenship law are classi­
fied into the catcgorv made up of the objects of private international law. 
(RAAPE-STURU: p 25 and HOCUSLAWSKV pp 78-87.). Other 
authors like the Germans and Anglo-Saxons exclude them from the cate­
gory of private international law and delegate them to the category of 
international law (STEVENSON p 562), or consider them as distinct 
areas of law (RAAPE—STURV! p 2b): the latter is the case with Ferenc 
Vládl and Lajos \ckás (MADE —VFKÁS p 48). W ithin the frame of this 
question the problems of citizenship cannot cause any difficulty but the 
combination of international law and private international law is quite 
obvious in connection with the principle of the minimum standard and in 
the case of diplomatic protection, and. The practice of expropriation and 
nationalization is fairly rich in rules of a double nature too.
In actual fact the principle of minimum standard is a supplementary 
provision of equal treatment to be given to foreigners (it is denied by the 
socialist countries HARASZTI- HERUZECH — NAGY: p 179). This is 
maintained by western authors (for example, VERDRGSS —81MMA pp 
.786 — 589) who say that the states are compelled by international law to 
guarantee certain rights of private international law even in case the citi­
zens of a countrv are not entitled to it (for example, defence of "acquired 
rights").
In contrast to consular protection diplomatic protection is generallv 
regarded as an activity belonging to the sphere of international law. Ho­
wever. in his book Private Internationa! Law Lunc says that "the diplo-
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matic intervention by a state in case the personal rights of its citizen or 
its organization are violated in another country means the insufficiency of 
the "normal" (judidicial or arbitrational) order of the particular legal 
system in the given case. An intervention of this kind means that in addi­
tion to the norms of civil law and private international law the rules of 
international law regulating the given relations between governments have 
also been violated." (LUNC: p 15.) The argument he gives is quite con­
vincing to prove that this kind of protection is of the nature of the grey 
zone.
Both expropriation and nationalization are fundamentally domestic 
affairs, that is to say they have nothing to do with international law. 
(BOGUSLAVSKY: p 130.) However, the sharp debate between east and 
west on this issue (see, for example, VEDROSS —SIMMA: pp 589 — 593, or 
S0RENSEN Manual pp 85 — 489) shows that this is largely ignored by 
practice. No wonder because a host of legal documents delegates the ques­
tion into international law, or more exactly, into the grey zone. It is suffi­
cient to mention in connection with this the provisions specifying global 
compensation in the Czechoslovak-Austrian agreements pertaining to 
the rights of property (19 February, 1974; BGBL 451/1975) or the Con­
vention of Establishment concluded by the United States and France in 
1959 (UNTS 401 vol. 75, 80.) which contains in Article 4 guarantees for 
appropriate compensation in the case of expropriation, or the Charter oi 
Economic Rights and Duties of States. The latter was adopted in 1974 by 
the United Nations General Assembly and although in legal terms it is 
not a binding document it is still a valuable testimony to the present state 
of affairs. Article 2. "Every state has the right . . .  to nationalize, ex­
propriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appro­
priate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, 
taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances 
that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of com­
pensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic 
law of the nationalizing state and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and 
mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be 
sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance 
with the principle of free choice of means." Without giving any interpre­
tation of the above quote it is believed to be easy to recognize the extent 
to which the elements of international law are mingled with those of private 
international law.
C) ?'Ae NoMrcea o/ ZuM?
It is an almost trivial fact that international law and private inter­
national law are mingled with one another in the field of the sources of 
law. It is beyond any doubt that the agreements codifying conflict rules or 
uniform law act as material for both international law and private inter­
national law. However, with respect to the interpretation of this fact the 
opinions are very different. One extreme view tends to incorporate the
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whole private international law of this kind into international law (for 
example Laduchensky and Krülov; see HRABSKOV pp 119 — 120 and 
Nussbaum; see STEVENSON p 564); the other view maintains by referr­
ing to the transformation by which the states render rules of this kind part 
and parcel of domestic law that they should be classified into the sphere 
of domestic law and deny their international nature altogether. (KEGEL: 
pp 4 -5 , N1EDERER pp 68 -72 ; BOGUSLAVSKY p 22.) Quite naturally 
there is also a transitional category lying between the two extremes; for 
instance, Hrabskov denies that a clear-cut answer would be possible 
(HRABSKOV: p 122.). Makarov does not go any further than reiterating 
the dualism of the origins arising from international law and the content 
associated with private international law (MAKAROV p 131.). f think that 
this is the position that corresponds most favourably to realities. Since 
these agreements which are the documents of international law "live or 
die" according to the international rules of the law of treaties as codified, 
by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. Their inter­
pretation, their being in force but above all their becoming obligatory for 
the citizens and legal persons take place in a manner identical with the 
"pure" international legal agreements.
While it is a must for the state to make it possible to translate them 
into practice they do not constitute any other obligation directly for the 
state which is a sovereign body. These agreements containing private inter­
national law rules live in the non-sovereign sphere; they are not relerred to 
in foreign ministries or international organizations; they are used as points 
of reference in documents establishing contract obligations, at courts and 
before the authorities of local administration. Their dual nature cannot, 
therefore, be challenged at all and must be recognized as the dialectics of 
form and content.
The transformation theories that can imagine the enforcement of 
international law in the domain of domestic law merely as a result oi a 
state action proper which is what legislation is have an additional weakness. 
They fail to supply explanation as to what the impact inside the country of 
a provision of international customary law can be attributed to, a provi­
sion that cannot be transformed into a domestic provision because of its 
nature since such a measure would be equal to unilateral codification. (It 
must be noted at this point that neither the Hungarian legal theory nor the 
official judicial policy could supply any answer to this difficult question; 
from a legal point of view it is stili a puzzle in Hungary today who can be 
obliged by the provisions of international customary law and for what 
and mainly on what grounds.) Although it is beyond any doubt that a 
number of questions belonging to the sphere of private international law 
such as, for example, the principle of equal treatment in the field of the 
law of aliens, are still regulated only by customary law. Obviously, there 
can be no doubt that the norms of this kind belong to the grey zone.
When reviewing the sources of law mention must also be made of 
whether or not private international law can contribute at all to the enrich­
ment of international law and whether there are norms which the latter
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borrowed or absorbed from the former and .subsequently incorporated into 
itself. The answer to this problem is negative with a single restriction. 
Para 1/c of Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
considers the general principles of law recognized by the civilized nations 
as a possible basis of the decisions of the International Court, that is, they 
are regarded as sources of law. Here another problem must be faced since 
these principles, provided they exist at all. are not recognized by evervone 
as sources of law. One of them is. Geza Herczegh (HHRCZÈC. (T: pp 
97 — 98.) who blocks the path of further train of thought in this direction. 
But if there are such principles, a point that is not denied even by Herczegh 
himself, and they act as sources of law for international law as suggested bv 
Verdross and others (ibid, p 97) the question may welt arise that one or 
the other may stem straight from private international law in the form of 
identical or similar basic principle of the private international law of seve­
ral countries. I shall come back to these debated rules when discussing 
international arbitration.
D) Hpp/mu/ma
The differences detectible in the enforcement of law are most charac­
teristic of the differences between international law and private interna­
tional law. The specificity of international taw ami the cardinal argument 
opposing it lie in the fact that theenforcement of international law promises 
doubtful results and does not hold out hopes for a settlement without the 
minimum of cooperation preserved between the oppsing parties. In private 
international law, however, the injured party has good reason for hoping 
that the violatin of his rights can be redressed with theassistanceof the deci 
sions to be taken by institutions lying above the parties involved in the 
legal case such as a court, arbitration tribunal or other authorities, or in 
the final resort by using compulsion. The difference involved is so marked 
that in case a person not sensitive to the refined chapters of legal dogma­
tics is to be given a reference basis helping him in the ways to decide if a 
legal involvement belongs to the sphere of international law or private 
international law, it would be quite sufficient to tell him to consider rela­
tions with international law implication in which the conclusion of respon­
sibility and bringing about legal consequences arc up to the parties them­
selves and take place through them, while it should be considered a case 
implying private international law if there is an organ or forum which does 
not settle the dispute between the oppsing parties only to the limit of co­
operation between them but, perhaps, explicity against one of the parties.
This explanation is naturally far from being satisfactory for an expert 
since international law also knows of the application of central sanctions, 
first of all in the range of authority delegated to the UN Security Council or 
in the form of collective self-defence as a manifestation of the legal conse­
quences of agression and it also adopts procedures similar to those used by 
the courts. These, however, do not have anything to do with the subject of
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this study. When mapping the grey zone consideration must be given to 
the arbitration tribunais which are ad hoc or standing international in­
stitutions that have been estabbshed on the basis of international law. 
Here the opposing parties involved are cither two states or a state and 
another budv which is not a state in connection with a judgement to be 
passed on cases of a civil law character and not directly stemming from 
sovereignty.
Their two major variations are quite well-known: two states come to 
be opposed to one another because it assumes the case of one of its civil or 
legal persons in its own sphere and in the course of adopting diplomatic 
protection it lays claim to another state, or a natural or legal person comes 
to be opposed directly to the state on the basis of an agreement signed by 
them beforehand or on the grounds of international law. It is common to 
both of them, and in connection with this let me recall the case of the 
Anglo —Iranian Oil Company versus the Persian Government, that an 
international forum established by an agreement belonging to the grey 
zone or involving international law has to take a decision on legal rela­
tions of a civil law content.
In such a case the question lies in whether the law applied by the 
respective international forum belongs to the sphere of international law 
or private international law. This is what Makarov has to say about the 
problem: If the international forum does not operate as an appeal court
and there are no conflict rules stipulated in the agreement between the 
states (parties) which could be regarded as lex fori of the international 
forum then the international forum itself is left with the duty of discover­
ing or establishing them and so, regarding their sources, they are norms of 
international law." (MAKAROV: p 132.) Lipstein, however, describes 
these norms as "international" norms of private international law, a 
concept that I approve. ("Rules of International Conflict of Laws" 
L1PSTHIN: p 174.). Both theory (McNAIR p 10.) and the arbitration 
tribunals that handle the cases tend to identify these norms as the general 
principles of law in line with para 1/c of Article 38 of the Statute of the 
Internationa! Court. Thus, for example, in the case of Saudi Arabia 
versus Arabian American Oil Company the court ruled that "the Arbitra­
tion Tribunal holds, therefore, that it has to ascertain the law to be applied 
to the merits according to the indication given by the parties, to determine 
this law by taking all circumstances of the case into consideration. In the 
present instance the agreement of the Parties does not relate to any single 
svstem of law. In so far as the Tribunal is empowered to determine the 
law to be applied, it will do so, by resorting to the general doctrine of 
Private International Law." (The quote is on the basis of Hambro — 
HAMBRO pp 43 — 44.) In the case of the sheik of Abu Dhabi and Petro­
leum Development Ltd. the umpire Lord Bishopstone ruled that neither 
the law of Abu Dhabi (since no such law existed) nor British law which 
was exludcd by the agreement could be applied and so the verdict will 
be based on "the application of principles rooted in the good sense and 
common practice of generality of civilized nations — a sort of modern
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law of nature" which, in my opinion, is also a description of the norms 
associated with the grey zone.
References must also be made to another characteristic practice 
adopted by arbitration tribunals. It was characteristic of the mixed tri­
bunals established after the First World War to act between the Allied 
Powers and the losing nations on the basis of the peace treaties (they 
were authorized to specify their own procedural rules) that they were 
authorized to bring a verdict in cases in which the citizens and legal per­
sons of the victorious states could lay claims against the losing states and 
their citizens as well as legal persons. It is not only the nature of the par­
ties that verifies the delegation of the above procedure into the grev zone 
but also the fact that the verdict was passed partly on the basis of the 
provisions of the peace treaties and partly on the basis of the general 
principles of private international law. It is also characteristic that the 
role played by the states was quite specific. The losing states did not have 
to bear the consequences of their affairs of a iure gestionis nature, but 
they bore the impacts of the actions committed in their sovereign status 
as warring parties. In other words they were made responsible in their 
capacity of a sovereign state in matters of purely civil law. (For example, 
the Hungarian State was made to pay a compensation of lő.000 francs for 
having deprived a French citizen of his motor car on September I!<th. 
1914. (Decisions . . . pp 75 — 76.)
Finally, let us examine whether or not there is any concrete correla­
tion between the enforcement of private international law through domes­
tic courts and the international law. The answer to this question is a posi­
tive one and it is based on the fact that the recognition of a state or govern­
ment which belongs to the very sphere of international law can exert 
considerable influence on both the enforcement of the immunity of the 
state that has been recognized and on the possibility of disposing of pro­
perty existing within the borders of the states that have performed the 
recognition. From our point of view it is much more important that quite 
frequently the court of the state that has performed recognition of another 
state applies the law of the state that has been recognized as reference law 
only after the process of recognition has been completed. In the same 
manner the measures that have been taken on the basis of supreme power 
will also be acknowledged following recognition. An excellent example to 
this effect is the case of Luther versus Sagor in which the British appeal 
court altered the ruling of a lower level court on the basis of the dc facto 
recognition by Britain of the Government of the Soviet Union while 
legal proceedings on a lower court level and on appeal court level were in 
progress. And it must also be noted in this connection that the legal con 
sequences of the nationalization implemented by the Soviet Union were 
also recognized as part and parcel of the general recognition. (DAHAl: p 
127.)
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VÖ LK ER R E C H T  -  INTERNATIONALES I 'R IVA TR EC HT 
(Rcchtsp)titosophic und  Nortuentc ttrc)
I)K . B O L D IZ S Á R  NA GY 
Un i versi t ä t  sassisten  t
(Z usam m enfassung)
Die V oraussetzung  d e r  A btrandtung  ist d ie a itgem eine B eschreibung  <tcs V erttáhn isses 
zw ischen V ölkerrecht und  In te rn a tio n a le m  I 'r iv a tre c h t, ntit besonderem  N achdruck  an die 
E lem en te  d ie  w eiter ins V ö tkerrech t noch ins In te rn a tio n a le s  I 'r iv a tre c h t  e indeu tig  e inge­
o rd n e t worden können . Die G esam th e it d e r  N orm en u n d  In s ti tu tio n e n  sotcher C h arac te r 
w ird ats ,,G raue  Zone " b e n an n t.
Im  e rs ten  Teil d e r  S tu d ie  w erden fotgenden H echtsph itosophischen  E tagen e rö r te r t:  
). W aru m  w ird  das In te rn a tio n a le s  P r iv a tre c h t an g ew endet?
2. W as fitr ein  Z usam m enhang  ist zu  bem erken  zw ischen d e r  N euordnung  d e r i 'ro d u k - 
tio n sv erh ä ttn isse  u n d  d e r  A usw eitung  tuet V eränderung  des t l 'R -s .
9. Im  welchen Masse b ecin fh tsst d as G esellschaftssystem  d e r  teitnehm enden  S ta a te n  
d en  S chw erp u n k t d e r in te rn a tio n a lp r iv a trec h tü ch e n  V erb indungen .
4. G edanken  ü b e r den W ertin h a it des V ötkerrech t. des IP R -s  u n d  d e r G rauen Zone.
Im  zw eiten fe il sind d o k tr in ä re  p räg en  d e r N orm entehre  in m ügtiehts n ich td o k trj- 
nette r Art b e an tw o rte t, ttndzw ar d ie L age d e r  S u b jek ten , d e r O b jek ten  und de r R cchtsquctten  
in d e r  ( tra u e n  Zone, wie auch  d e r E rzw ingttngstnechanism us.
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L Соотношение международного права н международного частного права вообще
t. Вопросы и ответы: почему действует международное частное право.
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4. Выбор ценности или неутральность.
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